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1165 
REVISITING BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN TAKINGS 
LITIGATION  
Michael C. Blumm* 
Rachel G. Wolfard** 
Abstract 
Libertarian property rights enthusiasts celebrated the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council as a landmark decision that would revolutionize interpretation of 
the Constitution’s takings clause and finally fulfill its potential as a 
vehicle for deregulation. Over a quarter-century later, the Lucas decision 
has failed to meet those expectations. A major reason is that Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s opinion created an exception that effectively swallowed 
the rule that Lucas established. 
Lucas held that land use regulations whose effect on landowners’ 
property produced a total loss of economic value were per se categorical 
takings. However, Justice Scalia qualified the categorical rule by creating 
an exception if the regulation merely replicated “background principles” 
of property or nuisance law. His Lucas opinion explained that an 
examination of background principles was a “logically antecedent 
inquiry” in takings cases because it defined the nature of the alleged 
“private property” taken by the regulation. Over the years, courts have 
interpreted the background principles rule expansively, while the per se 
takings rule has rarely applied. 
Background principles, as an inquiry antecedent to takings claims, 
demand analysis of applicable property and nuisance law because they 
determine the nature of the “private property” alleged to have been taken. 
Consequently, this examination is step one of any claim for 
compensation—regardless of whether it is an alleged physical occupation 
or appropriation, an economic wipeout, or a regulatory taking subject to 
judicial balancing. Step two—determining whether there has been a 
taking requiring government compensation—cannot proceed until a court 
conducts the initial inquiry into the alleged property right. 
This Article surveys recent background principles cases and builds on 
earlier studies. The survey reveals that courts have continued to recognize 
common law background principles such as the public trust doctrine, the 
navigation servitude, customary rights, and even burial rights. In addition 
to common law background principles, courts have found numerous 
statutory background principles—including public ownership of wildlife 
and water, zoning, and federal mining regulations. Other cases have 
rejected the categorization of some statutes as background principles, 
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including wetland regulations, environmental impact statement 
requirements, and flood control operations. 
Background principles are likely to continue to be a dynamic area of 
property and constitutional takings law for the foreseeable future because 
the issue will be raised early in nearly every takings case, and the results 
may be as varied as the states’ interpretation of their property and 
nuisance laws. Background principles should thus prove a fruitful source 
of state court modern interpretations of vintage doctrines like the public 
trust doctrine, customary rights, and public ownership of wildlife and 
water, and even burial rights. These cases will likely make takings law a 
vibrant area of property law for years to come. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution forbids the governmental taking of “private 
property” for public use without paying just compensation.1 A 
prerequisite to constitutionally-owed compensation is therefore a 
“taking” of “private property.” Since 1922, takings have included not 
merely physical occupations or appropriations, but also regulatory 
takings.2 Most of the commentary on the so-called “takings issue” has 
concerned the nature of regulations restricting private property sufficient 
to amount to a taking.3 But the initial judicial inquiry in takings litigation 
involves defining the “private property” at issue, because without a 
                                                                                                                 
 * Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. We 
thank John Echeverria for many helpful comments on a draft of this Article, which was discussed 
at a faculty colloquium at Lewis and Clark Law School and in a class at Vermont Law School, 
and we thank the participants in both for their suggestions. 
 ** 3L, Lewis and Clark Law School. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”); see Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) 
(incorporating the takings clause, the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be applicable to the 
states, through the Fourteenth Amendment); STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1-1 (5th 
ed. 2012); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 
310 (2007) (“Takings law flows from eminent domain: the inherent power of the sovereign to 
take private property . . . .”); Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, WASH. 
U. L. (1995), http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/articles/brief_hx_taking.htm [https://perma.cc/6JYV-
L29W] (“[I]n the last quarter century, [the Takings] clause has taken on a prominent role in 
constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with respect to the limits of state and local regulatory 
power.”); Joseph Y. Whealdon, A Primer in Eminent Domain and Takings Law Under the U.S. 
Constitution, A.B.A. (Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/ 
publications/the_101_201_practice_series/primer_eminent_domain_takings_law_under_us_con
stitution/ [https://perma.cc/XA6M-9EZH] (“This ‘Takings Clause’ provides that if the 
government seizes private property, that property’s owner must receive fair compensation.”). 
 2.  See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[I]f regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”).  
 3. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) (“We shall be 
dealing here with matters which, were they to find their way into a treatise on the law of eminent 
domain, would appear in the chapter on ‘What Constitutes a Taking: General Principles.’”); 
Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (1991) 
(“Intense interest stems partly from the Supreme Court’s professed inability to provide a general 
solution to the takings problem . . . .”).  
3
Blumm and Wolfard: Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1168 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
sufficient private property interest there can be no taking. The private 
property inquiry, in turn, requires judicial interpretation of “background 
principles” that shape the nature of property interests at issue.4 This 
Article explores recent case law interpreting the meaning of those 
background principles of property law.   
In 1992, the Supreme Court initiated what was widely thought to be 
an unprecedented era in property law jurisprudence when Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council5 established a new categorical rule for 
regulatory takings law.6 According to Lucas, regulations that deprived 
landowners of all economic value in their land amounted to per se 
takings,7 an exception to the generally applicable judicial balancing rule 
the Court established in its 1978 decision, Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City.8 Commentators who were critical of takings law 
and who believed that Penn Central failed to impose meaningful 
restraints on government regulation heralded the new per se rule as a 
welcome sea change that would usher in a new era of judicial oversight 
of regulations affecting land use.9  
That sea change never happened.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion equated oppressive regulations with 
permanent physical occupations that seize virtually all of a landowner’s 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 6. Id. at 1004. 
 7. Id. at 1030 (“When . . . a regulation that declares ‘off-limits’ all economically 
productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would 
dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.”). 
 8. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that courts must consider multiple factors when 
considering regulatory takings claims, including: (1) the character of the government action; (2) 
the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner; and (3) the regulation’s interference with the 
landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations). See generally John J. Costonis, 
Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
465 (1983) (discussing the judicial balancing test and advocating for a different approach); John 
D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171 (2005) 
(discussing the Penn Central factors). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web 
of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1993) (describing the Lucas decision as 
“anticlimactic”); James L. Huffman, Lucas: A Small Step in the Right Direction, 23 ENVTL. L. 
901, 901–02 (1993) (“Lucas . . . has promise from the point of view of those interested in 
maintaining a coherent system of property rights, not to mention those interested in complying 
with the Constitution.”); see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory 
Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 625 (2014) (“Given that the categorical rule of Lucas 
permits no remaining viable use . . . almost all property owners who might claim a regulatory 
taking would have to do so under the Penn Central standard.” (footnote omitted)). 
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rights and therefore categorically demand governmental compensation.10 
But this new per se rule contained an exception that has become a 
categorical governmental defense to takings claims, undermining the 
revolutionary potential of the Lucas per se rule. Justice Scalia announced 
that there was no categorical taking for economic wipeouts if a 
government regulation merely replicated a restriction that the common 
law imposed on landowners through background principles of nuisance 
or property law.11 This background principles defense—largely, although 
not exclusively,12 a function of state law—has swallowed the categorical 
per se takings rule Lucas established, simply because there are many 
more background principles than economic wipeouts.13  
What constitutes a valid background principles defense has proved to 
be a contentious and unsettled question over a quarter-century later. But 
as this Article shows, lower courts interpreting the background principles 
defense have successfully charted its outlines, and it is now a prominent 
feature of takings jurisprudence.14  
The evolution of the background principles defense is evident in 
recent cases extending the defense to statutory and regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (“[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon 
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his 
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”). 
 11. Id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent 
inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part 
of his title to begin with.”). 
 12. See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing private property created by federal 
law). 
 13. This submerging of the categorical rule beneath the background principles defense was 
evident within a decade of the decision. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s 
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2005) (describing the narrow range of categorical takings due to 
complete economic wipeouts; contrasting it with the expansive scope of the background principles 
defense); Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl, Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian 
Property, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805, 805 (2010) (explaining the continuing importance of the 
background principles defense and responding to the errors of a libertarian colleague); Echeverria, 
supra note 8, at 173 (“[T]his approach had the potential benefit of identifying actions that would 
be safely immune from takings liability – assuming these per se tests came to define not only the 
grounds, but also the outer limits, of takings liability.”); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, 
“Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 331, 376–81 (2003) (discussing the background principles defense in relation to 
wildlife protection). The inapplicability of the takings clause to public property like oysters was 
reinforced by Supreme Court’s decision in Horne v. Department of Agriculture (Horne II), 135 
S. Ct. 2419 (2015); see infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.  
 14. At the outset, we should acknowledge that we consider background principles cases to 
be all those in which the reviewing court considers the nature of the alleged property interest as 
an inquiry antecedent to the takings analysis, even if the court did not expressly mention the terms 
“background principles.”  
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restrictions—as anticipated by Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Lucas15—as well as in decisions applying it to all takings claims, not 
just those alleging a categorical, per se taking.16 The latter extension 
seems justified, seeing as all takings claims are premised on the alleged 
governmental taking of private property, and background principles 
define the nature of a landowner’s legitimate property interests. The 
nature of a landowner’s property interest is thus a foundational issue in 
all takings cases.  
Extending the background principles defense to all takings claims has 
occurred despite the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island,17 in which the Court rejected a background principles 
defense for all land development inconsistent with existing regulations.18 
Palazzolo reduced the effect of a pre-existing regulation to a pertinent 
factor that courts must account for in deciding the secondary issue of 
whether there has been a taking.19 Thus, not all pre-existing regulations 
are background principles—although some may be—and pre-existing 
regulations that are not background principles may still be important 
factors weighing against takings claims.20 One inquiry this Article 
investigates is when a pre-existing statute or regulation becomes a 
background principle, as opposed to merely a factor in determining when 
a taking has occurred.21 
One complication to the application of a background principles 
defense concerns the alleged takings of water rights for the benefit of 
species listed under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).22 The 
venue for such takings by the federal government lies in the Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 16. See infra Part V.  
 17. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 18. Id. at 629–30 (“It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be 
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s 
law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”). The Court instead reduced the effect of a pre-existing 
regulation to a pertinent factor in Penn Central balancing. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Investment-backed expectations, though important, are not talismanic under Penn Central. 
Evaluation of the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations instead is one factor 
that points toward the answer to the question whether the application of a particular regulation to 
particular property ‘goes too far.’”). 
 19. See id. at 629–30 (majority opinion). 
 20. See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Today's holding does not mean that the 
timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn 
Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the 
takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance.”). 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 83–89.  
 22. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012)). 
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Federal Claims (CFC) and the Federal Circuit.23 After some initial 
confusion,24 the CFC now considers alleged takings of water rights to be 
physical rather than regulatory takings.25 That interpretation may remove 
alleged takings of water rights from Penn Central balancing, but 
background principles remain the “logically antecedent inquiry” 
concerning the nature of the allegedly taken “property” interest in 
physical takings cases, even alleged water rights takings.26  
This Article assesses the background principles defense. Part I 
discusses its resurrection in Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion. Part II 
considers subsequent Supreme Court statements about background 
principles over the last couple of decades. Part III evaluates recent lower 
court decisions in both state and federal jurisdictions concerning common 
law background principles, considering both nuisance and property law 
cases. Part IV turns to statutory background principles, where the defense 
has had its greatest effect. Part V shows that background principles are 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012); id. § 1491(a)(1); see also ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
“TAKINGS” 5 (2013) (“[A] taking claim against the United States . . . must be filed in the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims, if plaintiff seeks more than $10,000.”); see also id. at 5 n.33 (“On the 
rare occasion that an ESA taking claim seeks $10,000 or less, the claim may be filed either in the 
Court of Federal Claims or in district court.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (concluding that “the government physically appropriated water that Casitas held a 
usufructuary right in” because “the government did not merely require some water to remain in 
stream, but instead actively caused the physical diversion of water”); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. 
United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 477 (2011) (“[I]t is difficult, conceptually, to think of a right to 
beneficial use as being physically taken . . . .”), aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Casitas 
Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007) (explaining the Supreme Court’s 
Tahoe-Sierra decision compelled the CFC to categorize water diversion restrictions as regulatory 
takings because they involve restraints on beneficial use, rather than government takeovers of 
property), rev’d, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United 
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (“In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—
the hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right itself . . . .”).  
 25. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 472  (“While the government has interfered with plaintiff’s 
ability to divert water . . . it remains to be seen whether the government’s actions will subsequently 
interfere with Casitas’s beneficial use of its water.”); Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319; see infra 
notes 181–191 and accompanying text.  
 26. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); see Baley v. United States, 
134 Fed. Cl. 619, 679–80 (2017) (declining to find a taking due to government restrictions 
imposed on diversions diminishing the flow into Klamath Lake to preserve habitat for endangered 
fish species because of senior reserved water rights possessed by the Klamath tribes); infra notes 
200–201 and accompanying text. The usufructuary nature of a water right makes it an especially 
unlikely vehicle for takings claims, since a water right is only a temporary-use right, whose scope 
is limited by state-imposed restrictions like beneficial use and public interest factors. See infra 
Part V. In some water rights takings cases, the CFC has unnecessarily complicated the application 
of background principles by assigning a high burden of proof to the federal government regarding 
the existence of a background principle of state law. See infra Part V. 
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not confined to Lucas-type economic wipeouts but also extend to Penn 
Central-type takings and physical takings. Finally, this Article concludes 
that the background principles defense, as the first issue for resolution in 
takings cases, will remain a vibrant area of takings jurisprudence because 
it represents an essential governmental defense against landowner 
compensation claims.  
I.  THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN BACKGROUND 
PRINCIPLES DEFENSE 
Today’s background principles defense was brought into focus by 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, which initially appeared to be a groundbreaking advance for 
landowners’ rights.27 Although that promise has since evaporated, the 
background principles defense has endured because it serves an important 
purpose: protecting federal, state, and local governments from 
compensation duties that would surely chill vital land use and 
environmental regulation.28 The rise of the background principles defense 
transformed takings cases by interjecting a threshold examination of the 
nature of the property rights that a landowner actually possesses before 
inquiring whether that right has been taken by government action—an 
inquiry not previously emphasized in takings case law.29 
The Lucas controversy is well known and need not be retraced in 
detail here.30 David Lucas purchased two oceanfront lots in 1986, with 
the intention of developing them for vacation-home sales.31 His plans 
were subverted in 1988 when South Carolina enacted the Beachfront 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Justice Scalia cited Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900), which found no taking 
where a government pier blocked access of a riparian landowner to Lake Superior, id. at 163, as 
a background principles precedent. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.   Other vintage background principles 
cases not cited by Justice Scalia in Lucas include: Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 
349, 353, 356 (1908) (rejecting a water rights taking claim on the ground that such rights are 
subject to the government’s valid exercise of its police power); United States v. Willow River 
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) (rejecting an alleged taking on navigation servitude 
grounds).  
 28. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 156 (2016) (“If . . . eminent domain law and regulatory takings law begin to 
subject ordinary administrative acts to a more stringent level of judicial scrutiny . . . the state’s 
willingness to take any administrative measures affecting property interests likely will be 
chilled.”). 
 29. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 367. 
 30. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to 
Promote More Efficient Regulation, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 302–18 (Gerald Korngold & 
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009); see also, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the 
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
1433, 1434–46 (1993) (summarizing Lucas’s factual and legal background).  
 31. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07. 
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Management Act,32 which prohibited new building on beaches to protect 
public safety and prevent erosion.33 Lucas filed suit challenging the 
application of the statute to his lots and claiming he was owed 
compensation for a taking of his property rights.34 The trial court agreed 
with Lucas, awarding him approximately $1.2 million.35 The South 
Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the statutory 
prohibition of building on the beach was tantamount to avoiding a 
nuisance, and no landowner had a right to maintain a nuisance.36 Aided 
by numerous amici, Lucas appealed the decision to the United States 
Supreme Court.37  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and announced that if the effect 
of the Beachfront Management Act to Lucas’s tracts deprived him of all 
economic use, he was in fact entitled to just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.38 Property rights and development enthusiasts celebrated 
the Court’s 6–3 decision39 as a major victory in their efforts to advance 
property rights at the expense of governmental regulation.40 But Justice 
Scalia’s opinion was more nuanced: it read takings jurisprudence as 
providing the government with a defense—even against the complete 
economic wipeouts that he declared otherwise warranted categorical 
                                                                                                                 
 32. 1988 S.C. Acts 634; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07 (1992).  
 33. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. The Beachfront Management Act was enacted to prevent the 
building of nuisances on coastal dunes, which function as a storm barrier to protect life and 
property. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (1990). 
 34. Lucas was never denied a building permit—instead, he claimed that the statute 
precluded the Coastal Division of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control from issuing a building permit, even though South Carolina amended the Beachfront 
Management Act to allow the Council to issue a special permit at variance with the Act’s general 
limitations. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010–12; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1).  
 35. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992)). 
 36. Id. at 899–900.  
 37. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1005 n.*. 
 38. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 502 U.S. 966 (1991) (accepting certiorari); Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1031–32. 
 39. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices White, O’Connor, and Thomas. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1005, 1006. Justice Kennedy filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment, but disagreeing that background principles were limited to 
common law. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The common law of 
nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power . . . .”). Justice Blackmun 
filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), as did Justice Stevens,  id. at 
1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a separate statement, alleging that certiorari 
was improvidently granted. Id. at 1076 (Souter, J.). 
 40. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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compensation—if governmental regulations merely replicate common 
law restrictions.41  
The background principles exception proved to be much more 
important than the per se takings rule it established.42 This Article 
explores the legacy of background principles below. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S POST-LUCAS CONSIDERATION OF 
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES 
One of the Supreme Court’s first post-Lucas mentions of the 
background principles defense was in the well-known Bush v. Gore43 
decision, in which the Court stopped vote recounts in the presidential 
election of 2000, allowing George W. Bush to assume the presidency.44 
In a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that background principles 
of property law determine whether there was an unconstitutional taking, 
but also averred,  
our jurisprudence requires us to analyze the “background 
principles” of state property law to determine whether there 
has been a taking of property in violation of the Takings 
Clause. That constitutional guarantee would, of course, 
afford no protection against state power if our inquiry could 
be concluded by a state supreme court, holding that state 
property law accorded the plaintiff no rights.45  
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (“A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, 
do no more than duplicate the result . . .  [of] the courts . . . under the State’s law of private 
nuisance . . . .”); id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The State should not be 
prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts 
must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.”). 
 42. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 367. 
 43. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Explaining that the Supreme Court generally defers to state court 
interpretations of state law, the Court cited takings law as one of a few “areas in which the 
Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state 
law.” Id. at 114; see also R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) 
(holding that federal courts ought not decide federal constitutional issues if a definitive ruling on 
a state law would terminate the controversy, establishing the so-called Pullman abstention 
doctrine).   
 44. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. 
Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE  L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001) (“[T]he case 
decided the outcome of a presidential election . . . .”). 
 45. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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The Court thus reaffirmed its intention to oversee assertions of the 
state law background principles defense established by Lucas.46 This 
announcement promised some federalism tension in takings cases.47 
In 2001, nine years after Lucas, the Supreme Court issued a divided 
decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, in which a six-justice majority 
ruled that land use regulations in existence at the time a claimant acquired 
title were not inherently background principles.48 Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion announced that if all pre-existing regulations were 
background principles defeating takings claims, the result would put too 
“potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle” of property rights, 
absolving the state “of its obligation to defend any action restricting land 
use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable,” effectively putting an 
                                                                                                                 
 46. The Lucas opinion signaled that the Court was prepared to oversee assertions by state 
courts of background principles: “We stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all 
economically beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of 
relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is 
presently found.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18. Presumably, ensuring the “objectively 
reasonable” application of state law by state courts would be the responsibility of reviewing 
federal courts. 
 47. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 
101 (1995) (“Judicial supervision of local governments facilitates federalism in the same way that 
enforcement of promises permits governments to confer benefits on future generations. A larger 
license for judges to change what they regard as inefficient laws adopted by higher levels of 
government is unwarranted, however.”); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The 
Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 473 (2000) (“[W]hen the 
Takings Clause is applied to local land use regulation, it must be tempered with a concern for 
federalism.”). 
Federalism tensions will be exacerbated due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. 
Township of Scott, No. 17-647, 2019 WL 2552486 (June 21, 2019), decided while this Article 
was in press. In Knick, a 5–4 majority overruled Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which held that a property owner must exhaust 
state remedies before bringing a takings claim in federal court, effectively meaning that the only 
federal review of state takings claims is through Supreme Court review of state supreme court 
decisions. 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). Knick involved a local law that (1) allowed public officials 
to enter private property to determine whether a cemetery exists, and (2) required all cemeteries 
to be open to the public during daylight hours, even burial plots in the backyard of a private house. 
Id. at 314. Knick, a landowner with burial plots, claimed that these requirements amounted to a 
denial of her right to exclude and therefore required compensation, but the state courts denied 
compensation. The Supreme Court’s reversal will allow the landowner to pursue her claim in 
federal court, but her chances of obtaining compensation are remote.  See infra notes 128–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 48. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). In Palazzolo, a landowner 
attempted to develop a twenty-acre tract bordering on Long Island Sound, eighteen acres of which 
were wetlands and submerged lands. Id. at 613–15. The Rhode Island Coastal Resource 
Management Council denied the landowner development permits because building on the site 
would have a significant adverse effect on nearby waters and wetlands, and the Rhode Island 
courts upheld the Council. Id. at 614–16 (majority opinion). 
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expiration date on restrictions that might otherwise warrant 
compensation.49  
The Court majority acknowledged that legislation could amount to a 
background principle but declined to state when a statute would earn this 
status. The opinion did explain, however, that an otherwise 
unconstitutional regulation “is not transformed into a background 
principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”50 
Recognizing a kind of equal protection implicit in the takings clause, 51 
Justice Kennedy announced that “[a] regulation or common-law rule 
cannot be a background principle for some owners and not for others.”52  
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 627; see also id. at 628 (“A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no 
compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty 
to compensate for what is taken. . . . It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings 
claim because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the 
claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner.”).  
 50. See id. at 629–30. 
 51. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630. A similar equal protection rationale was evident in 
Justice Brennan’s decision in Penn Central. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 133–34 n.30 (1978) (“These cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed 
‘noxious’ quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were 
reasonably related to the implementation of a policy—not unlike historic preservation—expected 
to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property.” 
(emphasis added)). Courts could conclude that a landowner who purchased with notice of a 
regulatory restriction might not be “similarly situated” to one without notice. See Sean B. Hecht, 
Taking Background Principles Seriously in the Context of Sea-Level Rise, 39 VT. L. REV. 781, 
786 (2015) (advocating that background principles be applied “evenhandedly”).  
 52. Id. at 630. Justice O’Connor concurred in the result, agreeing that not all pre-existing 
regulations were background principles. Id. at 632. But she emphasized that notice of such a 
regulation was an important factor in deciding whether there was a takings under the balancing 
authorized by Penn Central. Id. at 632–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Today’s holding does not 
mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial 
to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration 
from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance. . . . [I]nterference with 
investment-back expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine. Further, 
the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape 
the reasonableness of those expectations.”). The Court majority in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency approvingly cited Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. 
535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002) (“[F]or reasons set out at some length by Justice O’Connor in her 
concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island we are persuaded that the better approach to 
claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking ‘requires careful examination and 
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’” (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring))).  
The notice requirement has proved an important, perhaps critical factor in several cases. See, 
e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 527 (1998) (“Nor did the MPPAA interfere with 
employers’ reasonable investment-backed expectations, for, by the time of the MPPAA’s 
enactment, ‘[p]rudent employers . . . had more than sufficient notice not only that pension plans 
were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial 
obligations.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 
12
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On remand, the Rhode Island Superior Court decided Palazzolo on the 
basis of background principles. The court ruled that the state’s public trust 
doctrine and its public nuisance law foreclosed Palazzolo’s takings 
claim.53 The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided not to review the case 
again after remand, ending Palazzolo’s decades-long effort to fill 
shorelands for development.54   
In 2002, a year after Palazzolo, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency rejected a 
physical takings claim concerning a moratorium on land development 
adjacent to Lake Tahoe.55 In reaffirming that takings claims require 
judicial consideration of the whole property, the Court majority, per 
Justice John Paul Stevens, decided that the whole property included not 
just metes and bounds but also time. The court also ruled that it should 
not give a temporary land-use restriction “exclusive significance,” but 
instead that restriction should be merely a factor to account for under the 
Penn Central balancing rule.56 The Tahoe-Sierra majority clarified that 
                                                                                                                 
211, 227 (1986))); see also, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension 
Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645–46 (1993) (“At the time Concrete Pipe purchased Cen-Vi-Ro 
and began its contributions to the Plan, pension plans had long been subject to federal 
regulation . . . . Concrete Pipe’s reliance on ERISA’s original limitation of contingent liability to 
30% of net worth is misplaced, there being no reasonable basis to expect that the legislative ceiling 
would never be lifted.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104–05 (1985) 
(observing that public mining claimants take their “fully recognized possessory interests in . . . a 
‘unique form of property’” with notice of the federal government’s underlying fee title and its 
“substantial regulatory power over those interests” (quoting Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 
371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963)).  
 53. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *3–6 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 
5, 2005) (determining that the public trust doctrine foreclosed the claim of lands above the lower 
water mark, and that public nuisance doctrine foreclosed the claim of lands above the high water 
mark). 
 54. Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561, 561 (R.I. 2001). 
 55. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337–38. Justice Stevens wrote for a six-member majority; 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the three-member dissent. Id. at 305. Future Chief Justice John 
Roberts represented the interstate planning agency. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Tahoe-Sierra, 
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1480565. 
 56. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331, 337. The Court specifically rejected a rule requiring 
compensation for every delay in “routine” permitting because that would either make government 
considerations “prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking.” Id. at 335. This 
admonition would seem to weigh against the type of temporary judicial takings alleged in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 
704 (2010), and Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117 Acres, No. 10-1232-DWB-
MLB, 2013 WL 3328773, at *9 (D. Kan. July 2, 2013). See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying 
text. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra characterized the development moratorium 
as extending to six years (rather than the thirty-two months the majority employed), claiming that 
a moratorium of this length could not be a background principle of state property law. See Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351–52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] moratorium prohibiting all 
13
Blumm and Wolfard: Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1178 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
the Lucas categorical per se rule was a narrow exception to the general 
Penn Central balancing rule.57 
The next Supreme Court brush with background principles occurred 
in 2010 in the curious case of Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection,58 where the Court 
unanimously rejected a takings claim involving a beach restoration 
project in the wake of several hurricanes.59 Adjacent landowners objected 
to a state-imposed condition requiring new sand provided by the state to 
be shared by the public, but the Court agreed that the state court’s 
rejection of the landowners’ takings claims was fully justified.60 The 
unanimous Court agreed that the result was consistent with background 
principles of Florida law, which makes clear that landowners lack any 
compensable property rights as a result of avulsive changes to beaches, 
such a beach-restoration project.61  
                                                                                                                 
economic use for a period of six years is not one of the longstanding, implied limitations of state 
property law.”). 
 57. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (“[T]hese cases make clear that the categorical rule in 
Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives 
property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking context, we require a 
more fact specific inquiry.”). 
 58. 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 707, 713, 733. 
 60. Id. at 710–11, 729–31. All nine members of the Court agreed that there was no takings, 
but four members of the Court used the case to announce the view that judicial takings were a 
possibility (presumably when a state court’s interpretation of state law was unexpected, perhaps 
unsettling reasonable expectations). Id. at 707, 728; see Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Washington on that issue arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we must of course accept 
it as conclusive.”). 
 61. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 731–32. Avulsion is the process by which land is 
covered or uncovered by a sudden or violent change in shoreline, see Avulsion, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), whereas accretion is the process by which land is covered or 
uncovered gradually and imperceptibly, see Accretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). When avulsions occur, private property boundaries remain the same, whereas when 
accretions occur, property boundaries move along with the shoreline. See, e.g., Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, Boundaries Along a Waterbody, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03(b)(2) (Amy 
K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019) (examining the legal consequences of accretion and avulsion for 
property owners); Hecht, supra note 51, at 789 (maintaining that the doctrines of avulsion and 
accretion constitute background principles); Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its 
Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 306 (2010) (explaining avulsion 
and accretion). The Court suggested that the state might reconsider the role of state-created 
avulsions like beach-restoration projections. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732. Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence stated, “the Court should consider with care the decision to extend the Takings Clause 
in a manner that might be inconsistent with historical practice.” Id. at 739 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see also Hughes, 389 U.S. at 294–96 (Stewart, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
Court should have evaluated whether the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state 
constitution to deprive landowners of the right to future accretions of oceanfront property was a 
14
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Soon thereafter, in 2012, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. 
United States,62 a unanimous Supreme Court decided that temporary 
flooding of state lands due to federal dam operations could constitute a 
taking under the Penn Central balancing rule.63 The Court suggested that 
the result could have been different, however, had the government 
asserted background principles as a categorical defense to takings 
liability.64 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg announced that “government-
induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption 
from Takings Clause inspection,” although she acknowledged that the 
Court was “not equipped to address the bearing, if any, of Arkansas water 
rights law on this case” because the Federal Circuit did not examine the 
issue, implying that state water law could function as a background 
principle.65  
A potentially overlooked Supreme Court decision occurred in 2015 
when the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Horne v. United States 
Department of Agriculture, ruling that a federal “raisin reserve”—which 
employed marketing orders and agreements to withhold a portion of 
harvests in reserve to inflate prices for raisin producers66—worked as an 
                                                                                                                 
takings). A four-member plurality of the Court in Stop the Beach built on the Stewart concurrence 
in Hughes and stated that while the state’s public access condition took no property, a court 
decision could in fact take property, raising a multitude of questions that have yet to be resolved. 
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707, 730 (“There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before 
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future accretions and 
contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land.” (emphasis 
added)). Justice Breyer cautioned against the plurality’s endorsement of judicial takings, worrying 
that the losing party in state courts would routinely pursue a collateral attack in federal court. Id. 
at 744–45 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he approach the plurality would take today threatens to 
open the federal-court doors to constitutional review of many, perhaps large numbers of, state-
law cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges. . . . creat[ing] the distinct 
possibility that federal judges would play a major role in the shaping of a matter of significant 
state interest—state property law.”); see Michael C. Blumm & Elizabeth B. Dawson, The Florida 
Beach Case and the Road to Judicial Takings, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 713, 
757–58 (2011) (noting that Justice Kennedy, troubled both by procedural and remedial questions 
concerning judicial takings, observed that the due process clause provided an appropriate and 
adequate remedy limiting judicial authority concerning property rights); Mary Doyle & Stephen 
J. Schnably, Going Rogue: Stop the Beach Renourishment as an Object of Morbid Fascination, 
64 HASTINGS L.J. 83, 114 (2012) (“Any time a federal court answers the question whether an 
established right was eliminated, it will of necessity engage in an act of judgment—or rather, of 
second-guessing states’ judgments—about how property should be regulated.”).  
 62. 568 U.S. 23 (2012).  
 63. Id. at 26, 34, 37–38. 
 64. Id. at 38. 
 65. Id.; see infra Section IV.D (discussing public ownership of water). 
 66. Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 
2419 (2015). The raisin reserve, established during the Great Depression of the 1930s, authorized 
a committee of raisin industry representatives appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture to 
withhold a percentage of raisins from the market to maintain high prices for growers like Horne. 
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unconstitutional taking of a grower’s raisins.67 A five-justice majority 
overturned the lower court’s decision, which held that personal property, 
like raisins, was not subject to the same level of scrutiny as real 
property.68 Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the dichotomy, 
maintaining that for some 800 years, personal property had been given 
virtually the same protection as realty, and therefore the physical 
appropriation of federal raisin reserves amounted to a per se taking.69 
Yet, in response to an eighty-year-old precedent upholding a similar 
scheme imposed by the state of Maryland concerning oysters,70 the Chief 
Justice distinguished oysters from raisins. The former were wildlife 
belonging to the state under state law (ferae naturae), while the latter 
were private property: “the fruit of the growers’ labor—not ‘public things 
subject to the absolute control of the state.’”71 Without expressly 
mentioning background principles, the case turned on the distinction 
between the private property character of raisins and the background 
principle of state ownership of wildlife.72 
The most recent Supreme Court case involving background 
principles, Murr v. Wisconsin,73 involved determining the proper parcel 
for judicial evaluation in a takings claim, the so-called “denominator” of 
the takings fraction.74 In 1975, in an effort to protect the adjacent St. 
                                                                                                                 
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2421 (2015). Earlier, the Supreme Court 
had reversed the Ninth Circuit on jurisdictional grounds. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne I), 133 
S. Ct. 2053, 2063–64 (2013), rev’g 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 67. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2437 (explaining that a governmental mandate to relinquish 
property interests as a condition to engage in interstate commerce constitutes a per se takings in 
this case) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 68. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1144 (“[G]overnmental regulation of personal property is more 
foreseeable, and thus less intrusive, than is the taking of real property.”).  
 69. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426. 
 70. In Leonard v. Earle, the Court approved a state requirement that oyster packers remit 
10% of their marketable oyster shells as a condition of the privilege of harvesting oysters in state 
waters. 279 U.S. 392, 396 (1929). 
 71. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2431 (quoting Leonard v. Earle, 141 A. 714, 716 (Md. 1928)). 
 72. See John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: 
Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Sovereign Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 657, 688–96 (2016). 
 73. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
 74. Id. at 1945 (“[N]o single consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the 
denominator.”); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987) (“Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been 
taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions 
is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of 
the fraction.’” (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967))); Eagle, 
supra note 9, at 631 (noting that the answer to the denominator question may be outcome 
determinative). 
16
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Croix River, a federally designated wild and scenic river, the state of 
Wisconsin and St. Croix County forbade the sale or development of 
communally owned, contiguous lots as separate lots smaller than one acre 
of developable land.75 The Murrs, who wanted to sell one of their adjacent 
lots to finance the redevelopment of the other, claimed that the required 
merger of the lots constituted a taking, alleging a complete deprivation of 
all economic use of one of the merged lots.76 
A five-justice majority, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, invoked the 
Court’s whole-property jurisprudence77 to conclude that the relevant 
parcel for the denominator of the takings fraction was the sum of the two 
contiguous lots, which together retained considerable economic value.78 
Justice Kennedy indicated that the Court would not consider the state’s 
definition of property rights to be “coextensive” with the takings clause79 
because no one consideration would supply a litmus for the denominator. 
Instead, a number of factors—such as state and local law, the physical 
characteristics of the land, and the land’s prospective value—were 
relevant.80 But the result of the case seemed to turn on the role of 
longstanding state law, the 1975 merger provision. The merger provision, 
according to the Court, was “a legitimate exercise of government power, 
as reflected by its consistency with a long history of state and local merger 
regulations that originated nearly a century ago.”81 If this characterization 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940. 
 76. Id. at 1941. 
 77. Id. at 1950; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002) (“[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a 
taking of ‘the parcel as a whole.’”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (“Some 
of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured 
against the value of the parcel as a whole . . . .”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (“In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a 
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent 
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .”). 
 78. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944. Justice Kennedy observed that the combined value of the two 
lots, estimated at $698,300, was “far greater than the summed value of the separate regulated 
lots.” Id. at 1949 (noting that the summed value of the separate lots was just $413,000). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1945. Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[i]n particular, it may be relevant that the 
property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or 
other regulation.” Id. at 1945–46. Kennedy also noted that the relevant denominator (the size of 
the property) was not the product of “a bright-line rule,” id. at 1949, or a “simple test,” id. at 1950. 
Kennedy’s reliance on multi-factor balancing was quite typical. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry 
L. Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States’ Rights, and a Persistent Search 
for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667, 722 (2007). 
 81. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court noted that “[t]he land’s location along the river 
is also significant,” explaining that the Murrs “could have anticipated public regulation might 
affect their enjoyment of their property, as the Lower St. Croix was a regulated area under federal, 
state, and local law before [they] possessed the land.” Id. at 1948. 
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was not the Court recognizing the merger provision as a background 
principle of state law, it was quite close.82 
This brief review of recent Supreme Court takings decisions indicates 
that background principles clearly include statutes as well as common 
law principles. The Court has yet to indicate how old a statute must be to 
become a background principle, although not all regulations pre-dating a 
claimant’s property acquisition qualify.83 There is some evidence that six-
year-old police powers are not old enough, but those of forty years may 
be.84 Without expressly so declaring, the Court has assumed that normal 
delays in permitting,85 state rules on avulsive changes in shoreline 
lands,86 state ownership of wildlife,87 and land-use merger provisions88 
can all be background principles. At least one of these state-law rules 
originated as recently as 1975.89 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court has 
considered only cases involving state property law background principles 
as opposed to nuisance cases requiring the Court to review a lower court’s 
judicial balancing on a largely ad hoc basis.90 
  
                                                                                                                 
 82. The underlying regulation in the Supreme Court’s recent Knick v. Township of Scott 
decision, concerning burial rights, may be a background principle. See discussion infra notes 128–
35 and accompanying text.  
 83. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (discussing Palazzolo’s rejection of a 
categorical rule that all regulations predating acquisition of title qualify as background principles). 
 84. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 352 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] moratorium prohibiting all economic use for 
a period of six years is not one of the longstanding, implied limitations of state property law.”), 
with Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940 (forty-year-old merger provisions). 
 85. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[D]elays attendant to 
zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law and part of a 
landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.”). 
 86. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 
730–31 (2010) (“[I]f an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously 
been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact 
with the water. . . . The Florida Supreme Court decision . . . [was] consistent with the[] background 
principles of state property law.”). 
 87. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015) (“[T]he fruit of 
the growers’ labor—‘not public things subject to the absolute control of the state.’” (quoting 
Leonard v. Earle, 141 A. 714, 716 (Md. 1928))).   
 88. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947 (“The merger provision here is likewise a legitimate 
exercise of government power, as reflected by its consistency with a long history of state and local 
merger regulations that originated nearly a century ago.”). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 81–82 (discussing the lot-merger provision in 
Murr). 
 90. The lack of contested background nuisance cases may also reflect the fact that nuisance 
liability seldom leaves affected property without value. 
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III.  COMMON LAW BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN THE 
LOWER COURTS 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia emphasized that the “antecedent inquiry” into 
the nature of a claimant’s property rights was an examination of 
background principles of either property or nuisance law.91 Justice 
Scalia’s opinion gave examples of nuisance-like activities that would be 
background principles, such as flooding or siting a nuclear power plant 
on an earthquake fault.92 Earlier analyses confirmed that lower courts 
invoked background principles of property and nuisance law with some 
frequency.93 This Article considers the most recent cases involving each 
in turn. 
A.  Property  
According to recent case law, common law property rules that restrict 
the viability of a takings claimant’s case include the public trust doctrine, 
the navigation servitude, customary rights, and public rights to access 
cemeteries.  
1.  The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) 
Although there are a number of decisions recognizing the public trust 
doctrine (PTD) as a background principle,94 only one case of prominence 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that 
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the 
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use 
interests were not part of his title to begin with. This accords, we think, with our ‘takings’ 
jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding 
the content of, and the State’s power over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they 
obtain title to property.” (footnote omitted)). 
 92. See id. at 1029 (“[T]he owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be entitled to 
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that 
would have the effect of flooding others’ land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating 
plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant 
sits astride an earthquake fault.”). 
 93. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 325–26 (asserting that “the background 
principles defense to takings liability is expansive,” as evidenced from application by “[c]ourts in 
multiple jurisdictions”); Blumm & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 806 (“Over the last two decades, many 
courts have employed the ‘background principles’ defense to uphold government regulations 
accused of working unconstitutional losses of property rights.”); John D. Echeverria, The Public 
Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
931, 944–50 (2012) (explaining that some background principles preclude takings claims without 
barring the activity, while some ban the activity altogether). 
 94. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(using PTD as a background principle to reject a landowner’s takings claim); Casitas Mun. Water 
Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 458 (2011), aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003) (using PTD to deny 
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recently did so. In Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, the dispute involved two 
North Carolina oceanfront property owners who claimed that a town 
ordinance allowing the public to drive across their beachfront property 
worked as a physical taking.95 But the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
affirmed a lower court’s conclusion that the “antecedent inquiry” into the 
landowners’ property rights revealed that they lacked the right to exclude 
the public from the beach—a trust resource under state law.96 Relying on 
“the long-standing customary right of access of the public to the dry sand 
beaches of North Carolina,” the court concluded that the public had the 
right since “time immemorial” to access dry sand beaches in the state.97 
Thus, the adjacent landowners could not exclude the public from the 
beach.98 
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, the 2011 CFC 
decision that imposed this high burden, held that the government failed 
to prove that water use restrictions imposed pursuant to the Endangered 
Species Act could have been duplicated under background principles of 
California water law but nevertheless held that the plaintiff’s claim was 
unripe.99 A municipal water district claimed that the interruptions 
amounted to physical takings100 and sought compensation from the 
federal government.101 The government claimed that background 
                                                                                                                 
compensation for denial of bulkhead construction permits in tidelands); Blumm & Ritchie, supra 
note 13, at 341–44; Blumm & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 833–34; Echeverria, supra note 93, at 956–
70 (discussing the public trust doctrine in the context of alleged takings of water rights); 
discussion infra Part IV (discussing Casitas); see also Hecht, supra note 51, at 784 (explaining 
the broad agreement that the PTD is a background principle).  
 95. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 190, 192–93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
 96. Id. at 197. 
 97. Id. at 195–96 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2013) (“[P]ublic right of access to 
dry sand beaches in North Carolina is so firmly rooted in the custom and history of North Carolina 
that it has become a part of the public consciousness.”); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2018) 
(“The public having made frequent, uninterrupted, and unobstructed use of the full width and 
breadth of the ocean beaches of this State from time immemorial, this section shall not be 
construed to impair the right of the people to the customary free use and enjoyment of the ocean 
beaches, which rights remain reserved to the people of this State under the common law and are 
a part of the common heritage of the State recognized by Article XIV, Section 5 of the Constitution 
of North Carolina. These public trust rights in the ocean beaches are established in the common 
law as interpreted and applied by the courts of this State.”).  
 98. See Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 201 (“[P]ublic access is permitted, and in fact guaranteed, 
pursuant to the associated public trust rights.”). 
 99. See Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at  445, 477–78. 
 100. An earlier case so held. See Tulare Lake Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. 
Cl. 313, 314 (2001); see also Echeverria, supra note 94, at 956–62 (analyzing Tulare Lake).  
 101. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 445; see Echeverria, supra note 94, at 963–70 (analyzing 
Casitas); see also discussion infra Part VI (discussing Casitas). Water is a public trust resource 
under California law, eliminating any vested rights to continued water diversions, and requiring 
the state to exercise continuous supervision over the water resource and its allocation between 
20
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principles of state law, including the PTD, “inhere[d] in the [district’s] 
title” and shielded the government from takings liability.102 Although the 
CFC acknowledged that the listed species were public trust resources 
under California law,103 it decided that the federal restrictions on water 
deliveries did not “merely parallel and make explicit the restrictions that 
background principles of California water law already [have in] place.”104 
This suggested to the court that the restrictions were not justified as 
background principles.  
The court proceeded to impose a high burden of proof on the 
government, deciding that the government failed to demonstrate that the 
public’s interest in serving the needs of the listed fish was more 
compelling than the public interest as a whole, and therefore rejected the 
PTD-based background principles defense.105 The assumption that a 
federal court may decide that the PTD is inapplicable absent a separate 
public interest determination is one that no California court has endorsed. 
The curious result and reasoning of the case might have been a function 
of the fact that the federal government was asserting the background 
principles defense based on state, not federal, law.106 The result suggested 
that the defense could be subject to competing public interest balancing 
tests, seemingly inconsistent with the “logically antecedent” inquiry into 
                                                                                                                 
consumptive and non-consumptive uses. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 
709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (“[T]he core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign 
to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the 
lands underlying those waters.”). 
 102. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 452 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1029 (1992)). 
 103. Id. at 459 (“Defendant has convincingly shown that the steelhead trout are a public trust 
resource and that the state of California is concerned with their preservation.”). 
 104. Id. at 455–56. 
 105. See id. at 460–61. The court also rejected a statutory background principles defense, 
based on section 5937 of the state’s Fish and Game Code, which read: 
 The owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass through 
a fishway, or in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, 
around, or through the dam to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted 
or exist below the dam.  
Id. at 455 n.15, 460–61 (quoting CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937). In doing so, the court reasoned 
that “Section 5937 provides no quantifiable standard that would allow this court to determine 
whether requirements of the biological opinion and Section 5937 are one and the same.” Casitas, 
102 Fed. Cl. at 462; see Karrigan S. Börk et al., The Rebirth of California Fish & Game Code 
Section 5937: Water for Fish, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 813 (2012).  
 106. Although not a party to the case, the state did submit an amicus brief in support of the 
federal position when the case went before the Federal Circuit. Amicus Curiae Brief of California 
State Water Resources Control Board in Support of the United States, Casitas Mun. Water Dist. 
v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2012-5033). 
21
Blumm and Wolfard: Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1186 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
the nature of the claimant’s property interest, involving a narrower 
focus.107 
2.  The Navigation Servitude 
The navigation servitude, which Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion 
expressly recognized as a background principle,108 is a somewhat 
mysterious doctrine as it provides an exemption from takings liability for 
damage below the low water mark in connection with federal navigation 
projects.109 In 2013, the CFC rejected a takings claim concerning a 
riverfront property owner’s loss of deep-draft vessel access to its 
commercial shipping terminal, due to the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
authority to revoke access to the property based on an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) submitted to Congress.110 The court reasoned that 
whatever property interest the claimant had was “subsumed by the federal 
navigational servitude,” and decided that “[t]he economic value 
attributable to a strategic riparian location is not a compensable property 
interest when diminished or destroyed by the United States in aid of 
navigation.”111  
Just a year earlier, a judge of the same court obtained a contrasting 
result. In Mehaffy v. United States, that judge considered federal claims 
that the navigation servitude precluded a takings claim in a case in which 
the Army Corps of Engineers denied a fill permit application under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act.112 Although the landowner held a 
forty-year-old easement reserving the right to dredge and fill wetlands on 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
 108. See id. at 1029. 
 109. See Amy K. Kelley, The Commerce Clause and Navigability, in 2 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS § 35.02(c) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019) (“The navigation servitude . . . coexists with 
no other enumerated power of the federal government. With regard to most navigable waters, 
when the public exercises its traditional right of access, or the government exercises the navigation 
power itself, an impact upon private property rights that might be compensable between private 
parties, or against the government under other circumstances, will not be constitutionally 
compensable under the navigation servitude.” (footnotes omitted)). The navigation servitude is 
best understood as a reflection of the essential public of navigable waters, resisting attempts to 
claim private rights in these waters, an antimonopolistic impulse. For an analysis of the 
antimonopoly sentiments behind the related public trust doctrine, see generally Michael C. 
Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 1 (2017).  
 110. Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 746, 750–51, 759 (2013). 
 111. Id. at 756–57. 
 112. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 816, 884 (1972) (amending Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1151 (1948)); see Mehaffy v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 755, 757, 
769 (2012), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 18 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
22
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his property,113 the government argued that its “special rights in the 
navigable waters of the United States curtail the scope of takings claims 
that can be asserted against the United States in cases such as this.”114 
The court curiously announced that “an inquiry into a compensable 
property interest is not an analytical prerequisite” to a takings claim, 
apparently rejecting Justice Scalia’s “logically antecedent inquiry,” and 
proceeded to address the takings issue using the Penn Central factors.115 
While dismissing the background principles defense, the CFC 
nonetheless rejected the takings claim after determining that the 
landowner’s right to dredge and fill his property did not inhere in his title 
under the reasonable investment-backed expectations prong of the Penn 
Central analysis, as he had both constructive and actual notice of the 
twenty-year-old Clean Water Act permit requirements.116 In rejecting the 
categorical background principles defense of the navigation servitude, the 
court denied the takings claim under Penn Central balancing where the 
existence of the servitude was nonetheless a primary factor.117  
Two years earlier, the CFC considered the navigation servitude to be 
an inherent limit on claimed riparian rights in a case involving the 
government’s continuous discharge of polluted fresh water from a lake 
into rivers since the 1930s, which damaged the environment of the river 
in front of the riparian landowners’ home.118 The court held that the 
claimants had failed to prove they held the riparian rights of which they 
were allegedly deprived by the government’s action.119 Even if the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Mehaffy, 102 Fed. Cl. at 757–58. The court determined that rights reserved in the 
easement were “not immune from being subjected to more recent regulation.” Id. at 767. The 
Corps denied the permit for filling forty-eight acres of wetlands adjacent to the Arkansas River 
because a lack of a disclosed purpose that made it impossible to determine that the use of the fill 
would be for a water-dependent purpose, a failure to comply with local ordinances, a failure to 
produce a requested hydraulic study, and the Corps’ obligations under the navigation servitude. 
Id. at 759, 761, 763. 
 114. Id. at 763–64. 
 115. Id. at 764 (“Without commenting on the merits of the parties’ arguments, and despite 
the effort spent by the parties in briefing these issues, an inquiry into a compensable property 
interest is not an analytical prerequisite to ruling on defendant’s motion.”).  
 116. See id. at 767. The court noted that “‘although a takings claim is not barred by the mere 
fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction, it is particularly 
difficult to establish a reasonable investment-backed expectation’ in those situations where the 
party had constructive or actual knowledge of the restriction.” Id. at 765 (quoting Norman v. 
United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1092–93 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  
 117. Id. at 764–65.  
 118. Mildenberger v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 217, 217, 224–25, 247 (2010), aff’d in part, 
643 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 119. Id. at 241 (“Although the state may convey legal title to submerged lands to private 
owners, any rights thus conveyed are always subject to the state’s overriding obligation to protect 
the public rights of swimming, bathing, fishing and navigation.”); see id. at 248 (“[T]he servitude 
applies only to those governmental actions and projects that are related to the improvement of 
23
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claimants could prove they held such rights, the court ruled that the 
navigation servitude would bar a takings claim.120  
Although the CFC has yet to establish a consistent approach to 
background principles grounded on the navigation servitude, no takings 
claims have succeeded in cases in which the government has defended on 
that basis.  
3.  Customary Rights 
Over thirty years ago in a decision later questioned by Justice Scalia 
in a dissent from denial of certiorari,121 the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach recognized the public’s customary right 
to access Oregon beaches as a background principle.122 Texas law also 
recognizes public customary rights to use its beaches,123 but hurricanes 
and their aftermath have complicated these public usufructuary rights. In 
2012, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that even where the state has proven 
a customary right to use a beach, public rights do not extend to a newly 
created, post-hurricane beach if the new beach was created on previously 
unencumbered private lands.124 Thus, a landowner could successfully 
maintain a takings claim when the state attempted to assert public access 
rights to a post-hurricane upland beach on land that previously had not 
been subject to public customary rights.125  
                                                                                                                 
navigation. . . . If a public project is wholly unrelated to navigation, the government is not shielded 
from compensation liability by the federal navigational servitude.”). The court also noted that the 
navigation servitude does not protect the federal government from liability for property damages 
above the ordinary high water mark or from riparian damages on a non-navigable waterway. Id. 
at 249. 
 120. Id. at 263. 
 121. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211–12 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
to denial of certiorari).  
 122. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1207 (1994); see Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 347–49 (discussing Stevens).  
Stevens reaffirmed the Oregon Supreme Court’s landmark decision in State ex rel. Thornton v. 
Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), which recognized the public’s customary rights to use ocean 
beaches. See Stevens, 854 P.2d at 456; Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676–78. 
 123. City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 349 (1859) (explaining that the public has a 
right to use private property on seashores).  
 124. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012) (concluding that the public’s 
customary right to access the beach did not “roll” upland with the new beach if rolling onto 
previously unencumbered land). The Severance court acknowledged that Texas law recognized 
the public trust nature of tidelands, and that changes in tidewater can cause public trust property 
to shrink or grow, but decided that landward property at issue in the case was without “historic 
custom or inherent title limitations,” and thus was not subject to public use due to post-hurricane 
adjustment of beaches. Id. at 708, 721, 732. The court also made clear that the state’s obligation 
to prove customary use existed was a prerequisite to defending against takings claims as a 
background principle. Id. at 729. 
 125. See id. at 732.  
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Customary rights influenced the North Carolina Court of Appeals to 
reject a takings claim from landowners challenging public access to ocean 
beaches adjacent to their properties.126 In denying their trespass claims, 
the court explained that the landowners never had the right to exclude the 
public from privately owned beaches because in North Carolina, the 
public had a right to access dry-sand beaches “from time immemorial.”127 
4.  Burial Rights 
An overlooked background principle was raised in a case recently 
before the Supreme Court, in which the Court reconsidered the ripeness 
rule from Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank.128 Williamson County foreclosed takings claims in 
federal court until a state has refused compensation,129 meaning that most 
takings cases had to be filed first in state courts. In Knick v. Township of 
Scott,130 a landowner challenged the requirement that she had to file her 
claim first in state court, but the lower federal courts ruled against her on 
ripeness grounds.131 The Supreme Court reversed on the ripeness issue, 
apparently enabling takings claimants to forum shop between federal and 
state reviewing courts132  But Knick’s underlying claim that her right to 
exclude was taken by a Pennsylvania statute granting the public a right to 
access cemeteries located on private land during daylight hours133 has 
almost no chance to succeed, regardless of the forum court. 
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Knick is a commonplace statute 
mirroring a longstanding common law requirement that restricted private 
landowners’ ability to exclude others from accessing burial grounds.134 
The common law has long recognized rights in the dead, which the living 
must protect, including the right to undisturbed repose and the right of 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
 127. Id. at 195 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2013)). Thus, the court concluded that 
the state’s public trust doctrine protected the public’s right to drive on dry sand beaches. Id. at 
198. 
 128. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 
(1985) (describing the ripeness rule). 
 129. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 (“[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking 
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause 
until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.”). 
 130. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262 
(2018). 
 131. Id. at 314, 323. 
 132. See Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647, 2019 WL 2552486 (June 21, 2019). 
 133. Knick, 862 F.3d at 314–15.  
 134. The common law rule and its statutory overlays are discussed in detail in a Supreme 
Court amicus brief filed by cemetery law scholars in the Knick case. See Brief of Cemetery Law 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–14, Knick, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (No. 
17-647), 2018 WL 3740592, at *6–14.  
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the public to access their graves for purposes of visitation and 
maintenance.135 In short, the right to access graveyards is a classic 
background principle imposing an implied easement on applicable land 
titles. 
5.  Public Necessity 
A longstanding exception to compensation requirements for 
governmental takings is the public necessity doctrine, which is the idea 
that public rights trump private rights, without compensation, in 
emergencies.136 The Supreme Court has stated that “the common law had 
long recognized” the government’s authority to respond to “imminent 
peril—such as when fire threatened a whole community,”  even if the 
response involved “destroy[ing] the property of a few” to save lives and 
the property of the many.137  Justice Scalia recognized public necessity 
as a background principle in Lucas.138 
Although the public necessity defense has broader application,139 one 
court recently applied it in a public nuisance abatement action for a 
property owner’s failure to remove junk vehicles from his yard, noting 
that under settled doctrine, a state “may take, damage, or destroy private 
property without compensation, when the public necessity, the public 
health, or the public safety require it to be done.”140 The sparse, recent 
case law should not be interpreted as a harbinger of the invocation of the 
public necessity defense, especially in a future where climate change is 
likely to bring increased risks of flood and fire. 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 12–17, 2018 WL 3740592, at *12–17 (discussing rights of repose and 
access). See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the Graveyard, 
2006 BYU  L. REV. 1469 (2006) (exploring ancient rights associated with graveyards). 
 136. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Move Away from the Absolute Dominion Rule, in  2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 20.06 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019) (“The emergency doctrine 
basically is that where a situation ensures that some private property must be destroyed regardless 
of the decisions the government makes, it can choose which forms of property should be destroyed 
without having to pay compensation.”). 
 137. United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952). 
 138. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (“The principal ‘otherwise’ 
that we have in mind is litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the 
destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of 
a fire’ to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others.” (quoting Bowditch v. 
City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880))). 
 139. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Drought and Public Necessity: Can a Common-Law 
“Stick” Increase Flexibility in Western Water Law?, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 77, 92–99 (2018) 
(discussing the public necessity doctrine and its potential application to drought). 
 140. Ashe v. City of Montgomery, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2010) 
(quoting Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1933)). 
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B.  Nuisance 
Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion rejected statutory nuisances as 
categorical, per se defenses to takings claims, but it nonetheless provided 
examples of nuisances that would equip the government with viable 
nuisance defenses. The opinion stated that denying a permit for a fill to 
prevent flooding of nearby land or an order to remove a nuclear plant 
upon discovery of earthquake fault would not result in a taking.141 This 
suggested that new regulations, such as common law nuisance,142 could 
respond to new circumstances or “new knowledge” without paying 
compensation.143 Presumably, Justice Scalia was satisfied that these 
situations were remediable under common law nuisance principles long 
recognized to have sufficient elasticity to respond to new information.144  
In 2018, a lower New York court concluded that the state’s nuisance 
law did not forbid wetland fills. From the early nineteenth century until 
the 1970s, it was “longstanding practice and part of the common history 
of the City of New York” to fill wetlands for development, and thus state 
wetland regulations restricting fills could not be background 
principles.145 However, a 2016 New York appeals court decision rejected 
a landowner’s contention that a background principles nuisance had to be 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (“[T]he owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be 
entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation 
that would have the effect of flooding others’ land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear 
generating plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that 
the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.”). 
 142. There is a long history of common law nuisance responding to changed circumstances 
and new information. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780–1860, at 74 (1st ed. 1977) (suggesting that American courts became willing to 
“accommodate the law of nuisance to the demands of a developing society” around the time of 
the Civil War); Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some 
Historic Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 821 (1979) (“In 1894, 
Professor John T. Dillon of Yale predicted that American property law would see ‘important 
changes of substance and form’ as it adapted to the new values in American society. 
Appropriately, the res communes doctrine, one of property law’s oldest elements, may assist in 
this change.” (footnote omitted) (quoting J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND 
AND AMERICA 385 (1894))). 
 143. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.  
 144. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical and Regulatory 
Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory 
Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 435–36 n.210 (2007) (explaining that in Tahoe-Sierra, “new 
information” learned about the potential environmental harm of developing near Lake Tahoe 
allowed the government to exercise its police power to prevent that alleged nuisance from 
occurring); Joseph L. Sax, Reflections on Western Water Law, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 299, 303 (2007) 
(suggesting takings claimants may be victims of changing circumstances as new information is 
learned that authorizes the government to abate nuisances without incurring takings liability). 
 145. In re City of New York, No. (CY) 4018/07, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 51, at *11 (Sup. 
Ct. Jan. 12, 2018); see infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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recognized as a nuisance when a regulation was promulgated, observing 
that nuisance law was not static.146  
According to the CFC, operating a landfill is not a nuisance in the state 
of Washington because a Washington statute specifically authorizes 
landfills; this in turn makes the background principles defense 
inapplicable.147 The same court ruled that a federal order to dispose of 
uninfected breeder chickens, as part of a disease-eradication program, 
was not justified as nuisance-prevention because California law 
considered only infected chickens to be nuisances.148 The CFC 
determined that denial of wetland permits in connection with a sewer 
project in Minnesota insulated both the state and federal governments 
from takings liability on nuisance-prevention grounds.149 It 
simultaneously suggested, however, that alternative proposed sewer 
projects might not.150  
In 2014, a federal district court decided that a North Carolina town 
order prohibiting the repair of a beachfront cottage and requiring its 
removal after a hurricane was not a physical taking.151 Nonetheless, the 
court refused to dismiss the landowner’s regulatory takings claim, 
suggesting that the record did not indicate that a house in need of repair 
would constitute a nuisance under North Carolina law, since thousands 
of similar houses in the state are located on dry-sand beaches.152  
These cases suggest that if the government exercises its police power 
to abate or prevent nuisances, courts will likely find that takings claimants 
never held a property interest in an allegedly taken land use under 
background principles of state nuisance law.  
                                                                                                                 
 146. Monroe Equities, LLC v. State, 43 N.Y.S.3d 103, 106 (App. Div. 2016) (“Resolution 
of the instant claim does not rely upon application of a blanket rule. As discussed above, the record 
establishes that the right to install a septic system was never part of the bundle of rights acquired 
by the claimant.”). 
 147. See Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 479 (2009).  
 148. Cebe Farms, Inc. v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 179, 201–02 (2014). In another CFC 
decision, the court decided that controlled burns by the U.S. Forest Service were not a physical 
taking of private reality because of the agency’s power to prevent nuisances, like measures to 
prevent large-scale wildfires. TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 102 (2012), rev’d, 
722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013). But the Federal Circuit reversed without addressing the nuisance 
issue or background principles. See Trinco Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
 149. Bailey v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 310, 312–13, 321 (2014) (involving revocation of 
a state water quality certification and denial of a federal permit under § 404 of the Clean Water 
Act to develop property for residences). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, No. 2:11-CV-1-D, 2014 WL 4219516, at *3, *5 (E.D. 
N.C. Aug. 18, 2014). 
 152. Id. at *16. 
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IV.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN THE 
LOWER COURTS 
As indicated above, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lucas 
maintained that background principles could include statutes,153 
something Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not acknowledge.154 
Over the last quarter-century, both the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have largely embraced Justice Kennedy’s perspective, although they have 
not agreed with how long a statute must exist for it to become a 
background principle.155 
A wide variety of recent case law has recognized statutes as 
background principles. These decisions have considered whether wetland 
regulations, setback requirements, public ownership of wildlife and 
water, homestead exemptions, flood control limits, state environmental 
impact assessment requirements, public mining rights, and zoning 
restrictions qualify as background principles. Some of these measures 
have proved not to be background principles because of their relatively 
recent vintage.156 This Part surveys recent cases concerning statutory 
background principles. 
A.  Wetland Regulations 
In 2018, a New York trial court rejected a claim that state wetland 
regulations, dating from 1975, were background principles of state law, 
reasoning that that “prohibitions on filling and developing wetlands were 
never a traditional part of New York property law”; instead, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in 
response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever 
their source. The Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law; it protects 
private expectations to ensure private investment. I agree with the Court that nuisance prevention 
accords with the most common expectations of property owners who face regulation, but I do not 
believe this can be the sole source of state authority to impose severe restrictions.”).  
 154. See id. at 1029 (majority opinion).  
 155.  See, e.g., Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2011); Monroe Equities, 
LLC v. State, 43 N.Y.S.3d 103, 106 (App. Div. 2016). 
 156. Arguably, the age of a regulation should not be the exclusive determinative of its status 
as a background principle. Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion suggested that new information, like 
knowledge of an earthquake fault, could be the basis of a background principle. See Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1029, 1031 (“[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously 
permissible no longer so.” (citation omitted)); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
628 (2001) (rejecting a “blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right” 
because such a rule would suggest that new information may require compensation in some 
circumstances and not in others); id. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that “the 
regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue” shapes the 
reasonableness of expectations, suggesting that both the age of a regulation and the public purpose 
it serves are relevant factors in deciding whether it is a background principle for takings purposes).  
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claimed it was “longstanding practice and part of the common history of 
the City of New York” to fill wetlands, as they were viewed as 
impediments to development.157 Thus, the court concluded, “it is clear 
the New York State wetlands regulations did not simply make explicit a 
prohibition on activity that ‘was always unlawful’, [sic] and therefore the 
wetland regulations are not background principles of New York property 
law.”158 The insufficient 1975 vintage of the New York wetlands 
regulation seems inconsistent with the 1975 merger regulation on which 
the Supreme Court relied in Murr.159  
B.  Shoreline Setback Requirements 
Wetland regulations may not be background principles in New York, 
but setback regulations from lakebeds are—at least those that are eighty-
five years old at the time of property acquisition.160 The New York 
Appellate Division rejected a property owner’s allegation that to 
constitute a background principle, a state setback requirement had to 
prohibit an activity that New York courts recognized as a nuisance at the 
time the requirement was promulgated in 1920.161 Although the Court of 
Claims of New York acknowledged that a takings claimant “bears a 
heavy burden of proving each and every element of the claim[,] including 
the basic, ‘antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate,’” the 
court ruled that a background principles nuisance defense was not static 
and not measured by the nuisance doctrine at the time a regulation was 
promulgated.162 Consequently, the court decided that the setback 
requirement was a background principle and took no recognized 
compensable property right.163 
                                                                                                                 
 157. In re City of New York, No. (CY) 4018/07, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 51, at *11 (Sup. 
Ct. Jan. 12, 2018). The court decided that the 1975 regulations, recognizing the environmental 
importance of wetlands and restricting their development, marked “an abrupt reversal in the 
treatment of wetlands and constituted a distinct change in the legal rights of owners of wetlands.” 
Id. at *12–13. 
 158. Id. at *13. 
 159. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 160. See, e.g., Monroe Equities, 43 N.Y.S.3d at 106. 
 161. See id. The claimant in this case purchased the property at issue in 2005. Id. at 104. 
 162. Monroe Equities LLC v. State, 4 N.Y.S.3d 816, 825 (Ct. Cl. 2014), aff’d, 43 N.Y.S.3d 
103 (App. Div. 2016). 
 163. Id. at 822 (“[N]othing was taken from claimant to which he had an ‘of right’ entitlement 
at the time of purchase.”). 
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C.  Public Ownership of Wildlife 
Nearly all states declare they own the wildlife within their borders.164 
This public ownership enables state agencies to permit or license 
activities without conferring property rights.165 In short, wildlife harvests 
are conducted subject to revocable state conditions, which are in effect 
background principles.166 For example, permittees and lessees of 
commercial salmon harvesting rights in Alaska have no cognizable claim 
against the state for shortening the season or limiting the catch, according 
to a recent Ninth Circuit interpretation of Alaska statutes.167 Describing 
permits as licenses, and leases as use privileges on submerged lands that 
the state may revoke or modify without compensation, the Ninth Circuit 
seemed to imply that the fishing statutes are background principles that 
inhere in the holder’s usufructuary interests and consequently 
categorically bar takings claims.168 The result was quite consistent with a 
decision of the Federal Circuit several years earlier, which decided that 
federal fishing restrictions in the exclusive economic zone were 
background principles inhering in a fishing vessel’s title, and therefore 
denied a regulatory takings claim.169 
The Supreme Court’s discussion of oysters as public property in 
Horne, discussed above,170 recognized public wildlife ownership as 
sufficient to defeat a takings claim; thus, the Alaska result is hardly 
unusual. A recent Oregon case is typical. In upholding a criminal 
conviction for shooting deer, the Oregon Supreme Court confirmed that 
the state owns wildlife in a sovereign capacity in trust for the public.171 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. 
REV. 1437, 1488–1504 (2013) (listing state constitutional, statutory, and case law as sources of 
public ownership of wildlife). 
 165. See Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining such state 
action in Alaska). 
 166. See Hecht, supra note 51, at 785 (“[A] background limitation on property rights can 
coexist with a license or other mechanism that allows particular conduct provisionally, but does 
not confer a property right to continue it. . . . ‘[T]he only essential element of a background 
principle for takings purposes is that it excludes a claim of entitlement.’” (quoting Echeverria, 
supra note 943, at 950)). 
 167. See Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 168. See id. at 961, 966 (rejecting the First Circuit’s approach in Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 
909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990), which suggested that federal takings law, not state property law, 
defines the nature of a property right).  
 169. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., LP v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(noting that at the time the owner purchased the vessel, the Magunsen Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act was a background principle of federal law that inhered in the vessel’s title, 
precluding any harvester from possessing a property right to fish on the ocean).  
 170. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.  
 171. State v. Dickerson, 345 P.3d 447, 448, 453–54 (Or. 2015) (relying on State v. Hume, 95 
P. 808 (Or. 1908), among other cases). 
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The court’s reasoning reinforced the background principle of public 
ownership of wildlife precluding a private landowner’s takings claim.172 
D.  Public Ownership of Water 
As in the case of wildlife, most states—especially in the West—claim 
to own the water within their borders.173 This public ownership should 
operate as a barrier to successful takings claims against regulatory 
restrictions on the water use of rights holders. But the case law, especially 
from the CFC, is more complicated. 
In Hill v. State, surface water rights holders in Nebraska claimed that 
state-imposed restrictions on their diversions beginning in 2013 to fulfill 
the obligations under a 1943 interstate compact between Nebraska, 
Kansas, and Colorado amounted to a taking of their vested prior 
appropriation rights.174 The Nebraska Supreme Court decided otherwise, 
concluding that there was no taking because the scope of a property right 
in water is only for a “beneficial use” and that such a use is subject to the 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See id. at 455 (“[N]o person has an absolute property right in game or fish while in a 
state of nature and at large . . . the taking of them is not a right, but is a privilege, which may be 
restricted, prohibited, or conditioned, as the law-making power may see fit.” (alterations in 
original) (quoting State v. Pulos, 129 P. 128 (Or. 1913))). Federal wildlife regulations produce 
similar results. Although the decisions do not explicitly reference background principles, their 
reasoning is consistent with the background principles defense. For example, in Mountain States 
Legal Found. v. Hodel, the court rejected ranchers’ claims that wild horse herds, protected by 
federal law, took their property when the horses consumed grasslands on checkerboarded federal 
and private lands in Wyoming. 799 F.2d 1423, 1430–31 (10th Cir. 1986). The ranchers’ alleged 
that the effect of government protection of the horses amounted to a permanent government 
occupation of private grasslands, on the basis of “an unbroken line of cases” in which the Supreme 
Court has sustained government regulation of wildlife like wild horses despite reductions, 
sometimes severe, in the value of affected private property. Id. at 1429–30; see also Colvin Cattle 
Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 808–09 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding no takings due to federal 
government’s failure to prevent wild horses from interfering with a rancher’s state water rights); 
Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334–35 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no takings due to federal 
protection of grizzly bears that preyed on a rancher’s livestock); Chittenden v. United States, 126 
Fed. Cl. 251, 264 (2016) (reasoning that the installation of “bat gates” by the U.S. Forest Service 
was not a takings of mining rights because of the agency’s statutory authority to protect wildlife 
and public safety).  
 173. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust 
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 57 (2010) (“[I]n almost all prior appropriation states, state water law 
includes a declaration, constitutional or statutory, that the state or the public owns the fresh water 
itself. . . . For public trust purposes, therefore, such declarations leave western states free to 
impress waters with public trust protections entirely independently of state ownership of the beds 
and banks of navigable waters, extending many state public trust doctrines to non-navigable 
waters.”). 
 174. Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208, 211–12, 215 (Neb. 2017). 
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state’s obligations under the Republican River Compact.175 The court 
declared that “[n]o compensation is owed in a takings claim if the State’s 
affirmative decree simply makes explicit what already inheres in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”176 
Consequently, the state-imposed condition of “beneficial use” on water 
rights holders, combined with the state’s obligation to comply with 
interstate compacts, amount to background principles—even if the 
compact is later in time than the affected water rights.177 
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a similar takings claim in an 
ensuing case concerning the same compact. After recognizing that “a 
takings analysis begins with an examination of the nature of the owner’s 
property interest,” the court observed in Cappel v. State Department of 
Natural Resources that water is a public resource in the state.178 
Consequently, irrigation water rights are limited by the state’s 
requirement that the water be used for a “beneficial use” and subject to 
reasonable subsequent regulations.179 The court therefore concluded that 
the water rights holders “have not pled a physical or regulatory taking of 
private property.”180 
Takings claims against the federal government for over $10,000 lie in 
the CFC.181 In recent years, the CFC has staked out a unique position 
concerning takings claims involving water rights and background 
principles. Nearly two decades ago, in Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District v. United States, the court, per Judge Paul Wiese, announced that 
temporary restrictions imposed by the Bureau of Reclamation to carry out 
its obligations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to protect 
endangered delta smelt and winter chinook salmon during a drought 
amounted to a physical, per se taking.182 The court decided that the ESA 
restrictions amounted to a permanent physical occupation of the state 
                                                                                                                 
 175. 1943 Neb. Laws 377 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-106 (2018)); Hill, 
894 N.W.2d at 217–19, 221.  
 176. Hill, 894 N.W.2d at 215. 
 177. See id. at 215–16 (“[T]he apportionment made by the [c]ompact cannot have 
taken . . . any vested right. . . . [T]he apportionment is binding upon the citizens of each State and 
all water claimants, even where the State had granted the water rights before it entered into the 
compact” (second and third alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hinderlider v. La 
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106, 108 (1938))). 
 178. Cappel v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 905 N.W.2d 38, 46, 48 (Neb. 2017) (“Water in 
Nebraska is a public resource dedicated for certain uses.”). 
 179. Id. at 48–49.  
 180. Id. 
 181. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). CFC decisions are appealable to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., 
Stearns Co. v. United States, 396 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 182. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314, 319 
(2001).  
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water rights of irrigation districts with federal water delivery contracts.183 
Tulare Lake also rejected federal arguments that the state’s PTD was a 
background principle that barred the claim.184  
Although Judge Wiese recognized that under California law the PTD 
was in fact a background principle that could prohibit inconsistent water 
diversions,185 he decided that any implementation of the doctrine against 
a diverter as a background principle had to come from the state water 
board or a state court, not from a CFC judge.186 Why a federal court could 
not interpret state law was left unclear, although Judge Wiese cited the 
PTD’s “complex balancing of interests.”187 Yet in an earlier decision, 
Judge Wiese invoked nuisance balancing in applying background 
principles to deny a regulatory takings claim of a mining company.188 
The Tulare Lake decision earned some withering criticism,189 and 
Judge Wiese later decided he had erred in concluding that water diversion 
restrictions were physical, per se takings after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Tahoe-Sierra case,190 in which the Court described per se 
takings as narrow exceptions to the generic balancing paradigm 
established in Penn Central.191 Somewhat astonishingly, rather than 
appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, the Bush Administration chose 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Id. at 319 (“To the extent, then, that the federal government, by preventing plaintiffs 
from using the water to which they would otherwise have been entitled, have rendered the 
usufructuary right to that water valueless, they have thus effected a physical taking.”).  
 184. Id. at 320–24. 
 185. Id. at 321 (“[P]laintiffs have no right to use or divert water . . . in a way that violates the 
public trust.”). The California Supreme Court made clear that the PTD applied to state water rights 
in its Mono Lake decision. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) 
(en banc). 
 186. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 323–24 (stating that enforcement of PTD is “committed to” 
the state agency and courts, while the CFC “is not suited and with which it is not charged” to 
implement the state’s PTD). Judge Wiese claimed that the CFC could apply the PTD as a 
background principle only when the doctrine functioned as a “single, discrete resolution.” Id. at 
323. 
 187. Id. at 323. 
 188. See Rith Energy v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 115 (1999), aff’d, 247 F.3d 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 189. See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered 
Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 551 (2002); John D. Echeverria, Is 
Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 594–98 (2010). 
 190. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 105–06 (2007), rev’d, 
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (2008).  
 191. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323–27 
(2002). The Court justified the categorical, per se rule for physical takings on the ground that they 
were “relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual 
property rights.” Id. at 324. The Court also instructed lower courts that the “temptation to adopt 
what amount to per se rules . . . must be resisted.” Id. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).  
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to pay some $26 million in compensation.192 One CFC judge later 
suggested that the Tulare Lake diverters obtained compensation “for the 
taking of interests that may well not exist under state law.”193 
In a subsequent decision, the Federal Circuit declined to embrace 
Judge Wiese’s revised view that the alleged takings of the right to 
beneficial use should be evaluated as regulatory takings. On the peculiar 
facts of Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States,194 which 
involved more than a governmental restriction on water diversions—
specifically, a physical diversion of water from the district’s irrigation 
canal into a fish ladder to protect endangered steelhead trout—the Federal 
Circuit said that a physical takings analysis did apply.195 The court 
reached this conclusion in part due to the arguably mistaken notion that 
the district owned the water in the irrigation canal.196 The case’s 
distinctive facts and the decision’s misunderstanding of California water 
law make Casitas an unreliable precedent. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly refused to apply it in other water rights takings cases.197 
Neither the Tulare Lake nor Casitas court prefaced its consideration 
of whether water rights restrictions for species preservation were takings 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See Echeverria, supra note 189, at 581 n.14. 
 193. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (2005) (explaining that 
Tulare Lake “appears to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others and, distinguishable, at 
all events”); see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Ct. App. 
2006) (“The [decision’s] reasoning is flawed because in that case the government’s passive 
restriction, which required the water users to leave water in the stream, did not constitute a 
physical invasion or appropriation . . . . Tulare Lake’s reasoning disregards the hallmarks of a 
categorical physical taking . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 194. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 195. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The fish ladder was a requirement imposed 
upon the district by the federal biological consultation process of the ESA. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 
1301. 
 196. See Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1286–87. Water in California is publicly owned. CAL. WATER 
CODE § 102 (West 2018) (“All water within the State is the property of the people of the State, 
but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by 
law.”). Water rights holders have only a usufruct, a use right in the water, one that is quite 
conditional: requiring consistency with the requirements of both the beneficial use and public trust 
doctrines. CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2018) (“The right to water or to the use or flow of water 
in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this State is and shall be limited to such water as 
shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall 
not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable 
method of diversion of water.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 538; see also, e.g., Estate of Hage v. 
United States, 685 F. App’x 927, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that where the government restricts 
use of property, instead of occupying it, no physical taking occurs), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 479 
(2017); Mildenberger v. United States, 643 F.3d 938, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a physical 
takings claim involving water quality concerns); CRV Enters. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that there is no Supreme Court “hold[ing] that a physical taking 
of water rights occurs merely when a particular use of the water is restricted”).  
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on the “logically antecedent inquiry” of whether state law foreclosed the 
takings claims. The Tulare Lake decision did, however, suggest that 
resolving this issue was a matter for state officials.198 The Federal Circuit 
clarified the role of background principles in water rights takings claims 
in a pending case also involving restrictions imposed on water diverters 
to preserve endangered species. In Baley v. United States,199 the CFC 
decided that there was no taking concerning Bureau of Reclamation-
imposed restrictions to preserve three endangered species of fish due to 
the background principle of the prior federal reserved water rights of the 
Klamath Tribes.200 If the Federal Circuit affirms the CFC, it will clarify 
that antecedent to any takings evaluation—whether based on physical or 
regulatory takings principles—is an analysis of the nature of the property 
right in water the claimant actually possesses: a background principles 
inquiry.201  
E.  Flood Control Requirements 
In the wake of Hurricane Harvey in 2017, a number of Texas property 
owners claimed that federal dams operated by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers caused flooding, which in turn effected an alleged taking of 
their property.202 The CFC agreed. The court in In re Upstream Addicks 
& Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs rejected the federal 
government’s background principles defenses and concluded that neither 
the Texas Water Code203 nor the federal Flood Control Act of 1928204 
was a background principle foreclosing the takings claims.205 However, 
the court’s reasoning was thin; it decided that the mere passage of a 
statute prior to a government action does not inherently become a 
background principle precluding a property owner of a judicial remedy. 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See supra note 185–86 and accompanying text.  
 199. 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (2017). 
 200. Id. at 625, 668, 679–80 (deciding that the challenged water rights restrictions did not 
constitute a taking because Baley’s water rights were subject to more senior water rights held by 
the Klamath Tribes).  
 201. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1046–47 (1992) (explaining 
that even categorical takings were subject to the antecedent background principles inquiry). In 
Baley, commercial fishermen argued that a background principle—public ownership of fish and 
wildlife in Oregon—prevented any takings of water rights. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Pacific 
Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations at 27–29, Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (2017) (Nos. 18–
1323, 18–1325) (arguing that the background principle of public ownership should preclude a 
takings claim).  
 202. In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658, 
661–62 (2018). 
 203. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.086 (West 2017). 
 204. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2012). 
 205. In re Upstream Addicks & Barker, 138 Fed. Cl. at 668. 
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Moreover, the court made no effort to distinguish other decisions 
suggesting just that.206  
F.  Homestead Exemptions 
In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
ruled that a 150-year-old New York homestead exemption, as applied to 
a creditor’s judgment lien against a debtor, qualified as a background 
principle of New York property law, inhering in the creditor’s property 
interest in the lien.207 The same decision ruled that a federal lien-
avoidance provision, entitling individual debtors to avoid liens on certain 
types of property, was not a background principle, as it was only enacted 
in the 1970s.208 On the other hand, an Ohio court recently concluded that 
a state homestead exemption was a background principle of state law, as 
it was over 160 years old.209 
G.  Public Land Mining Rights 
In 2012, the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) withdrew 
over a million acres of public lands from entry and exploration under the 
federal mining law for twenty years to protect the Grand Canyon 
watershed.210 Vane Minerals had over 600 mining claims within the 
withdrawn area that, due to the withdrawal, it could not enter or explore 
absent a federal BLM determination of prior “valid existing rights” 
(VER).211 The company filed suit, claiming that the withdrawal was a 
taking of its mining rights. But the CFC ruled that Vane’s federal property 
right depended on a finding that it had discovered a valuable mineral, 
which in turn required a VER determination at the time of the 
withdrawal.212 Because the company lacked such a determination, it 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Id.; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 207. 1256 Hertel Ave. Assocs. v. Calloway, 761 F.3d 252, 266–67 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 208. See id. at 266. The rejection of the lien-avoidance provision reinforced the notion that 
wetland regulations promulgated in the 1970s were not background principles, at least in New 
York. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 169–74 (1973); supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 209. In re Davis, 539 B.R. 334, 349 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015) (noting that a homestead 
exemption defines the scope of a lienholder’s property interest in investment-backed 
expectations). 
 210. Public Land Order No. 7787, 77 Fed. Reg. 2563, 2563 (Jan. 18, 2012). The Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act authorizes such withdrawals, subject to specified procedures, 
including sending to Congress a report explaining the reasons for the withdrawal, its 
environmental and economic effects, alternatives evaluated, the extent to which the public and 
other agencies were consulted, and detailed information on the geology and future mineral 
potential of the area. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2) (2012).  
 211. Vane Minerals (US), LLC v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 48, 52–53 (2014). 
 212. Id. at 61–62. 
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could not show a property interest sufficient to prevail in a takings suit.213 
As a result, the ruling effectively treated the requirements of the federal 
mining law as a background principle of federal law.214 
H.  State Environmental Impact Statement Requirements 
In 2016, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 
decided that the state’s EIS requirement prior to large land developments 
was not a background principle of state law.215 The court rejected the state 
land use commission’s position that a landowner’s failure to obtain an 
EIS precluded a takings claim. The court instead decided that the 
requirement “is not a prohibition on land use based on principles of 
nuisance or property law,” as it “merely requires that an owner seek an 
assessment of the proposed use’s potential environmental impact.”216 As 
a result, the court concluded that the failure to obtain an EIS did not 
preclude a landowner’s takings claim for the reclassification of urban use 
of land to agricultural use.217 
I.  Zoning Restrictions 
An ocean-bordering county’s 2014 imposition of a 150-foot marine 
buffer zone restricting shoreline developments to mitigate environmental 
damage associated with coastal flooding was not a taking, according to 
the Washington Court of Appeals in Olympic Stewardship Foundation v. 
Washington Environment & Land Use Hearings Office.218 The court 
decided that even though single-family homes are a priority use under 
state law, the county had the authority to restrict development to further 
ecological goals and, “[i]n fact,” development was permissible “only if 
[it would] result in no net loss of shoreline ecological functions and 
systems.”219  
Although the Washington court did not explicitly mention background 
principles, it seemed to reject a takings claim under that premise when it 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Id. at 63. 
 214. The Supreme Court has described federal mining rights as a “unique form of property,” 
which puts miners on notice of both the federal government’s land ownership and its substantial 
regulatory authority. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963); see United 
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985). 
 215. See Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Haw. Land Use Comm’n, No. 11-00414 SOM-BMK, 
2016 WL 797567, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.  
 218. Olympic Stewardship Found. v. Wash. Envtl. & Land Use Hearings Office, 399 P.3d 
562, 567, 572, 574–76, 585–86, 599 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). The buffer zone was to fulfill the 
requirements of the state Shoreline Management Act of 1971. Id. at 567–69. 
 219. Id. at 572 (interpreting the state’s Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 90.58.010–.920 (2018)). 
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stated, “the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations . . . ha[ve] a fundamental and 
inalienable right to a healthful environment and that each person has a 
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the 
environment.”220 This result was completely contrary to the federal 
court’s interpretation of Hawaii’s EIS requirement.221 
A more direct invocation of background principles occurred in a case 
involving a re-zoning of residential property back to commercial property 
located in Thibodaux, Louisiana.222 The applicants seeking the rezoning 
challenged its denial, but the state court of appeals decided that, because 
the rezoning took place in 1979 and was not for a malicious or improper 
purpose, “it is a background principle that is a defense to recovery of 
damages under Louisiana’s takings law.”223 Louisiana courts thus appear 
more willing to consider statutes or regulations to be background 
principles that are less than a half-century old than are New York 
courts.224 The twenty-five-year period recognized in this decision is 
similar to the Wisconsin merger provision that the United States Supreme 
Court upheld in Murr.225 
This survey of recent case law reveals that background principles 
remain a critical first inquiry that takings claimants must successfully 
hurdle to succeed in takings cases. This is true regardless of whether the 
challenge is to state wetland, water, shoreline, or zoning restrictions, as 
well as to wildlife regulations, homestead exemptions, or federal mining 
limitations. 
V.  APPLYING BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES TO PENN CENTRAL AND 
PHYSICAL TAKINGS CASES 
The Lucas case established the government’s background principles 
defense in the context of a regulation depriving a landowner of all 
economic value.226 There remained some question as to whether 
background principles could be a defense in cases not involving 
economic wipeouts; that is, in Penn Central-type takings and 
governmental physical appropriations or occupations. The early results 
indicated that the background principles defense was not limited to 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See id. at 571–72 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.21C.020). 
 221. See Bridge Aina Le’a, 2016 WL 797567, at *9 (concluding an EIS is not a background 
principle). 
 222. See E. First St., LLC v. Bd. of Adjustments, No. 2007 CA 0664, 2008 WL 2567080, at 
*1 (La. Ct. App. June 6, 2008).  
 223. Id. at *5. 
 224. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.  
 225. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 226. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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economic wipeouts.227 These results were only logical, as Justice Scalia 
described the background principles defense as the “logically antecedent 
inquiry” into any claimant’s alleged property rights.228 There seems to be 
no good reason why such a prerequisite inquiry into property rights 
should be limited to regulations alleging complete economic wipeouts. 
Recent cases confirm this admonition, although not without revealing 
some complications. 
A.  Penn Central Takings 
As indicated above, at least one CFC judge rejected a categorical 
background principles defense and proceeded to engage in contextual 
Penn Central balancing, deciding that an antecedent inquiry into the 
claimant’s property interest was unnecessary.229 That was an exceptional 
result, as most courts considering the issue assumed that Lucas’s 
“antecedent inquiry” is a prerequisite to any successful takings claim. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted an Alaska limit on fishing leases 
and permits to amount to a background principle that foreclosed a takings 
claim.230 Similarly, federal mining law proved to be a background 
principle concerning mining on public lands: Without complying with the 
prerequisites of a federal property right to mine, the claimant had no 
viable takings case concerning the government’s withdrawal of 
permissible mining entry on lands adjacent to the Grand Canyon.231 
B.  Physical Takings 
The Supreme Court has issued several decisions finding takings for 
permanent physical occupations, beginning with a small TV cable wire 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 326 nn.27–28 (citing physical occupation and 
Penn Central-type takings cases decided prior to 2005). 
 228. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 229. See Mehaffy v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 755, 764 (2012), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 18 
(2012). For discussion of this case, see supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text. Judge Miller 
explained that wetland fill permit denial cases are “almost always one of a regulatory taking,” and 
consequently maintained that “courts should proceed directly to the Penn Central factor analysis 
unless there has been . . . a categorical (regulatory) taking such as that present in Lucas.” Id. at 
764. The implication was that the court would engage in Penn Central balancing without inquiry 
into the nature of the property interest of the claimant, in apparent contradiction to Justice Scalia’s 
admonition. There were no other recent examples of this reluctance to treat background principles 
as an antecedent inquiry. 
 230. See Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 2011). For discussion of this case, 
see supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Vane Minerals (US), LLC v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 48, 58–59 (2014). 
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in Manhattan several decades ago.232 Recently, the Court found a physical 
taking of personal property in connection with a government “raisin 
reserve” program aimed at maintaining market prices.233 Lower courts 
have applied background principles in physical takings cases, although 
the CFC has again created some confusion, particularly in the context of 
alleged water rights takings.  
Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme 
Court have employed the background principles analysis in beach access 
cases, despite claims that public access amounted to physical takings.234 
Likewise, the Nebraska Supreme Court thought that an interstate compact 
was a background principle, despite a claimed physical taking of prior 
appropriation water rights.235 Similarly, the CFC determined that 
government-induced flooding of riparian land and degradation of 
waterways in Florida, which occurred when the government discharged 
water from Lake Okeechobee into the St. Lucie River to avoid flooding, 
was not a taking due the background principle of the federal navigation 
servitude.236  
All of these decisions involved applications of background principles 
to alleged physical takings, which is no surprise given the reasoning of 
Lucas.237 Yet, the CFC decided that a restriction imposed on water rights 
to protect endangered species did not qualify as a background principle, 
after discounting the effects of state limitations on the scope of water use 
imposed by the PTD and the concept of beneficial use—two background 
                                                                                                                 
 232. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982) 
(“[P]ermanent occupations of land . . . are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial 
amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use of the rest of his land.”). 
 233. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424, 2426–27, 2431 (2015) 
(discounting any distinction between personal and real property in takings jurisprudence); see also 
supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 234. See generally Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) 
(finding no taking due to ordinance recognizing public access); Severance v. Patterson, 370 
S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012) (refusing to recognize a “rolling” public easement in the wake of a 
hurricane); supra notes 96–98, 124–25, 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208, 214, 218–19 (Neb. 2017) (suggesting that compact-
imposed restrictions were background principles, affecting even senior water rights); supra notes 
175–77 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Mildenberger v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 217, 255 (2010), aff’d in part, 643 F.3d 
938 (2011). A federal decision to install a sand cap and log boom as part of a Superfund 
remediation project to prevent navigation and dredging from stirring up sediment that contained 
hazardous chemicals, including carcinogens, did not, according to the Federal Circuit, amount to 
a physical taking. CRV Enters. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1244, 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
2010).  The court reasoned that the claimants had never held the property rights that were allegedly 
taken because the government action predated the acquisition of those rights. Id. at 1250. 
 237. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining how Justice Scalia equated 
economic wipeouts with physical occupations). 
41
Blumm and Wolfard: Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1206 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
principles.238 A subsequent CFC water rights decision turned on the 
background principle of prior Indian water rights, with the court 
concluding that these rights foreclosed the takings claim.239  
This review of recent case law confirms that an inquiry into 
background principles is the antecedent inquiry concerning alleged 
physical invasions, just as it is for Penn Central regulatory takings.  
CONCLUSION 
Background principles of property and nuisance law are bedrock 
principles of Anglo-American law. No takings claimant has a right to 
government compensation absent a showing that its claimed property 
right is in fact a verifiable and vested one.240 This is the “logically 
antecedent inquiry” that Justice Scalia sketched in Lucas,241 although the 
defense was recognized by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes over a century 
earlier.242 The defense requires an evaluation of relevant state and federal 
law bearing on the claimant’s asserted property interest.  
The background principles defense resembles the old categorical 
government nuisance-prevention defense, which the Lucas majority 
rejected.243 The effect of replacing the noxious use defense with the 
background principles defense was, however, hardly revolutionary: 
simply obligating government defendants to do more than merely claim 
that an activity was harmful and requiring that a regulation be anchored 
in common law or longstanding statutory law. The result was not 
insignificant to litigators, since it imposed a burden of proof on the 
government’s defense of regulations. Because most of these laws will be 
state laws, there could be some tension between state court interpretations 
of state background principles and federal court interpretations of the 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 455–58, 461 (2011), 
aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 680 (2017); supra notes 26, 200–201 and 
accompanying text. 
240. See Echeverria, supra note 93, at 944 (explaining that although the Court had recognized that 
a vested right was a precondition for a successful takings claim in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1980), the Lucas decision caused the Court to define with 
greater particularity the nature of a vested, and therefore compensable, property interest). 
 241. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 242. See Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). 
 243. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. The origins 
of the “noxious use” defense are traceable to Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“But restriction imposed to protect 
the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in 
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.”). 
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Fifth Amendment.244 But there should be little federal court intervention, 
since states usually determine the nature of the private property rights 
protected by the compensation promise of the Constitution, and federal 
courts are not experts in state laws.   
This Article’s review of recent case law has uncovered many more 
statutory background principles than common law principles. Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Lucas has apparently triumphed. The cases do 
not reveal how old a statutory provision must be to qualify as a 
background principle, but there is evidence to suggest that forty years is 
sufficient.245 The vintage of the statute, however, was only one variable 
of the government defense that Justice Scalia recognized in Lucas, as 
Justice Scalia also acknowledged the severity of adverse effects on public 
resources.246 So, future cases may emphasize not merely the age of the 
statute but also its public importance and perhaps its relationship to 
longstanding common law principles. 
Background principles are likely to lead to a vibrant takings law 
jurisprudence in the years ahead. Because the property rights determined 
by the background principles of law are the antecedent inquiry to whether 
a regulation has taken private property, government defendants will 
assuredly raise the background principles defense at the outset of 
litigation. And since background principles underlie all takings claims, 
including permanent physical occupations and appropriations, economic 
wipeouts, and regulatory takings, courts will have ample opportunities to 
consider the issue. Although the government must show the regulation is 
grounded in property or nuisance principles, takings claimants must 
shoulder the ultimate burden of demonstrating that their private property 
has been taken.247 Because the issue will usually be a question of state 
law, there will be no uniformity of background principles jurisprudence 
among the jurisdictions, with the possible exception of federal takings 
claims in the CFC and Federal Circuit.248  
                                                                                                                 
 244. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land 
Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 473 (2000) (“[W]hen the Takings Clause is applied to local 
land use regulation, it must be tempered with a concern for federalism.”); Andrew W. Schwartz, 
No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 294 (2015) (“Federal court review of local and state regulation of property 
use . . . is inconsistent with principles of federalism embodied in the federal Constitution.”). 
 245. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 246. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31. 
 247. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 730 
(2010) (“There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future accretions and contact with the water 
superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000). 
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We are probably only at an early stage of background principles 
jurisprudence. Given the government’s incentive to raise a background 
principles defense early in all takings cases, and given the multiplicity of 
jurisdictions interpreting the “private property” that is a prerequisite to a 
takings determination, background principles are likely to continue to be 
a dynamic area of property law in the years ahead.249 
 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Government defendants could contribute to the dynamism of background principles law 
by linking statutes to other longstanding statutes or common law rules. See supra text 
accompanying note 47 (observing that state statute recognizing access to burial sites was 
consistent with longstanding other statutes and common law); supra text accompanying note 81 
(discussing the Murr court decision to uphold the statutory merger provision, referring its 
consistency “with a long history of state and local merger regulations that originated nearly a 
century ago,” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1947 (2017)). 
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